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Moreover, .instruction 19 requested. by defendant~ rel~ted to
the same issue. It is idle for a, party to complain of an error
in an instruction giv:en at the request of his adversary when
an instruction requested by him contains that, er~or. (Yolo
Water&- Power, Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48 [186 p, 7721;
(i-eorge v. City of hOS Angeles, 51 CaJ..App2d 311 [124 P.2d
872J; Jes$ev. Giguiere, 24 Cal.App.2d 160 [74 P.2d 310J;
see 24 Cal.Jur. 870.)
. [11] Defendants next complain that at plaintiff's request
the jury was inst:r.:ncted that conversations of alleged coconspirators could be taken into consideration in determining
whethe~ the bank, even thQugh no agent thereof was present
at th~conversatiQns, was a party to the conspiracy. While instruction 13 could have been clearer it is not open to the interpretation of de~endE1nts. The jury was expressly cautioned
that unless it first found that the bank had been established
asa party to the aIi~ged co~spiracy, it could not corisiderthe
testimony regarding,the conversations as tending to inculpate
the bank. Plaintiff's instruction 11, allegedly 'including 'an
implication that appellants admitted the perpetration' of . a
fraud by some of the defendants, likewise is not open to the
suggested construction. In .referring to fraud, the trial judge
took care to add thequaUfying words "if.any," and in instruction 36 expressly cautioned the jury that the existence
of fraud could be determined only from the evidence and
could. not be inferred· from the instructions.
Other assignments of error in the giving and refusing· .of'
instructions as well as in the admission of evidence and allowance of, comments before the jury have been examined. Upon
a review of the entire record, it does not appear that the
errors, if any, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Const.,
art. VI, § 4%; Code Civ. I'roc. § 475.) The tdal court,
therefore, did not err in denying defendants' motions for .nonsuit, new trial, judgment notwithstanding verdict or the
motion to strike the evidence at the close of plaintiff's case.
.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson., C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J. pro tem., concurred.
. Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January
21,1943. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.
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[L. A. No. 18419. In Bank. Dec. 23, 19~.t
OALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHAN<lEl' "
(an Inter-Insurance Exchange), P~titioner;'v)INbUS-'
TRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION. alid"J.ANE
G.
: 1 ,.
DUFFUS, Respondents.
'
..
:~,' ~.

;'

[1] . Workmen's Compensation-Compens,able Injurie~~anspor
tation in Employer's Conveyance.-Wherean e!riployee, ail an.
incident of the employment, is furnished With tl'ltnspol'tation
to and ,from the place of e1pployment and the'means of 'trans';
portation are under the control of .the empli>yert.aninjury :s~
tained by the employee during such transportation isconipen-,
~able.

[2] .Id.-~ompensable Injurie8-'Transportation In Employer's Con-'
ve,yance-Agreement.-An agreement:by an employe:.; to furnish transportation to employees. may be. implie!i . from, the
circumstances and from the uniform course ,of conduct of the,
parties. An inference thereof may: be 'drawn from the facts.
that the employee, when hired, understood transportation
would' be furnished, that· on the. first day of employment she
rode ina car, and that she was theninformedihitt it was' the'
company .car and that a deduction from her wages for its use
would be made.
, [3] Id. - Compensable Injuries,..- Transportation in Employer'i
Conveyance-Agreement.~An inference of an agreement by
an 'employer to furnish employees with transp~rtation 'is not
prechide'd by his right to withdraw the privilege at any time,
or by the employee's freedom to use other transportation.
)
[4] Id.-Compensable Injurie~Transportation in Conveyanc~
Incident to Employment.-Where transportation is reguilU'ly
furnished by an employer to' employees solely because of their
status as such, it . may be inferred that transportation depends. '
on the ·fact· of employment and is-incidental thereto.
[5] Id. - Compensable Injuries- Transportation in Employer's
Conveyance - Employee's Payment. - An employer's agreement to furnish transportation to employees is not trans-'
. [1] InjUry while going to or coming from work, notes, 10 A.J;..R., '
169; 21 A.L.R. ,1223; 24 A.L.R.1233; 62 A.L.R.1438; 87 A.L.R. 250.
See, also, 27 Cal.Jur. 383,
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Workmen'sCompensation, § 100;'
[6] Workmen's Compensation, § 77.
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formed into an independent contract of carriage by the 'fact
that a charge is made therefor, where the consideration for the
transportation is employment as well.
'
[6] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Rendering Service at Time.Workmen's compensation is recoverlj,ble although the employee
is not rendering service to his employer at the time, where the
danger from which the injury results is one to which, he is
exposed by his particular employment.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding damages"for personal injuries.
Award affirmed.
Richard L. Oliver and Judd Downing for Petitioner..
Everett A. Corten and Dan Murphy, Jr., for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Jane Duffus was employed as a stenographer in Fullerton by the, Val Vita Food Products; Inc.
She and several other employees of the company lived in'
Los Angeles thirty-three miles away, and for their convenience the company purchased an automobile to transport
them to and from work. There was a bus line between Los
, Angeles and Fullerton, and the employees were not required
to use the automobile, but those who did were charged $4.00
amonth,representing a pro rata share of the running expenses, which was deducted from their wages. The employees
would decide among themselves who was to drive, and' there
, was no regular driver. The employee who lived the farthest
away would drive the car home, keep it over night' and in
the morning pick up the other employees on the way to work.
On April 18, 1941, three employees of the Val Vita com- ,
pany, including Mrs. Duffus; were driving home in the automobile. One of them left the car, and shortly thereafter
it collided with another automobile, injuring Mrs. Duffus.
The employees had punched the time clock before leaving
the plant, but, as was their custom, had taken with them
office mail, which they, deposited in a mail box on the road.
The driver of the automobile had also taken samples to be
delivered to a salesman of the company in Los Angeles. Mrs.
, ,Duffus was not driving the car at the time of the collision.
She applied for compensation under the California Work, men's Compensation Act, and the Industrial Accident Commission made an award in her favor. ·Theinsurer of the
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Val Vita company now petitions for a writ to review this
award, contending that the evidence does not support the
finding of the commission that the accident arose out of and
occurred in the course of the applicant's employment.
[1] Petitioner contends that the case falls within the gen~'
eral rule that injuries sustained by an employee while going
to or coming from his place of employment are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (See 21'
Cal.Jur. 380.) It is well recognized, however" that if an
employer, as an incident of the employment, furnishes his
employee with transportation to and from the place of eIp.'
ployment and the means of transportation are under the con.,
trol of the employer, an injury' sustained by the employee
during such transportation arises out of and is' in the course:
of the employment and is compensable. (Dominguez v. Pendola, 46 Cal.App. 220 [188 P. 1025]; Trussles8 Roof 00. ,v;
Industrial Ace. Oom., 119 Cal.App.91 [6 P.2d 254}; Rader
v. Keeler; 129 Cal.App. 114 [18 P.2d360] ; see Dellepiani v.
Industrial Ace. Oom., 211 CaL 430 [295 P. 826]; Smith Vi,
Industrial Ace. Oom., 18 Ca1.2d 843, 846-847 [118 P.2d 6] ;
10 A.L.R. 169; 21 A.L.R. 1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R.
1438;87 A.L.R. 250; 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 63; cf. Oalifornia
Highway Oom. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 61 Cal.App. ,284
[214 P. 658].) The case of St. Helens Oolliery 00., Ltd. v.
Hewitson, (1924) Appeal Cases 59, upon which petitioner
relies, represents the English rule but not the law in the'
United, States. (American Ooal Mining 00. v. Orenshaw,
77 Ind.App. 644 [133 N.E. 394]; Phi!er'sDependents' v.
Foremost Dairy, 200 N.C. 65 [156 S.N.. 147,62 A.L.R.
1438] .) There is no question that ,the automobile in the
instant case was furnished by the employer to the employees
for' the purpose of transporting them to and from work. It
is also clear that the car was under the employer's controL
(Tr~ssless Roo/Oo. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., supra; Konopka
v. Jackson Oounty Road Oom., 270 Mich. 174 [258 N.W.429,
97 A.L.R 552]; Phifer's Dependents v. Foremost Dairy, BU·,
praj McClain v. Kingsport Improvement Oorp., 147 Tenn.'
130 [245 S.W. 837] ; Swanson v. Latham & Orane, 92 Conn.
87 [101 A. 492] .; Osterhout v. Latham & Orane, 92 Conn. 91'
[101 A. 494].)
Petitioner, contends, however, that the, t:r:anSportation fur·'
nished the employees of the company was not an incident'
of their employment but merely an accoinmodation thattliei

.'
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might use or not as they wished. The employer, however,
supplied transportation to and from its office as a regular
practice, and the employee regularly used that transportation. [2] An agreement by an employer to furnish transportation need not be express; it may be implied from the
eircumstances of the case and the uniform course of conduct
of the parties. (Rader v. Keeler, supraj In re Donovan, 217
Mass. 76 [104 N.E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778] ; Konopka v.
Jackson Oounty Road Com., supraj Southern States Mfg.
, Co. v. Wright, 146 Fla. 29' [200 So. 375]; Venho v. Ostrander
By. ~Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138 [52,P.2d 1267, 1268] ; see
Breland v. Traylor Engineering ~ Mfg. 00., 52 Cal.App.2d
415 [126 P.2d 455].) Mrs. Duffus testified that when she
was hired she, understood that transportation to and from
the office would be furnished her. On the first day of her
employment she rode to work in the automobile and was told,
by one of the employees who had stopped for her that i~
was a company ,car, and that $4 a month for its use woul,d
be deducted from her wages. These facts were sufficient
to support an inference, that there was an implied agreement,
to furnish transportation.
[3] Petitioner contends, however, that such an agreemel1-t
cannot be inferred because the employer was under noobligation to p,rovide the automobile and could discontinue its
Use at anytin:);e, an¢!. the employees were under
obligation to USe it and could use other available means of tranS~
portation"at any time. These considerations, however~ do
not preclude' the, eXistence of an implied agreement on the,
part of the employer to furnish the transportation as an,
incident of the employment. The employer's right to with.
di-awthe privilege of using the car was merely a right to
terminate the contract at will, and was uot inconsistent 'with
the existence of the agreement~ A contract at will remains
a contract until it is terminated. Contracts of employment
are' usually of this nature, and the fact that an employer,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may at any
time terminate the employment or change any of its terms,
such as the amount of the' employee's wages, does not preclude the existence of the contract. Likewise, the employee's
freedom to use other transportation no more precludes the
existence of an agreement than the freedom of the purchaser
of a railroad' ticket to use other transportation than that
for which he paid. (American Oool Mining 00. v. Orenshaw,

i;
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suprajKonop'ka v. Jackson County Road Oom., supra.) The
,basic contract between the parties was one for employment.
Although such' contrac~ may consist simply ofa promise to
work in: exchange for a promise to pay a certain wage, they
may also in.volv:e additional promis~ by e~ther ,Party. An
employer may give his employee, III conSIderatIOn f?r the
employee's work, both a wage and the, accommodatIOn of
transportation to and from the place of employment. In the
present case' the employer was obligated to pay Mrs. Duffus
the agreed wage and to furnish the automobile for her transportlltion. ~he in turn was obligated to perform the work
for which she was hired and to pay $4 a month for transportatiollto and from work.
[4] Petitioner contends that even if the evidence shows
an agreement to furnish transportation it w:as. not part of,
the contraet of hire and therefore not an Illcldent of the
employment. Transportation may be incidental to the em'ployment,, however, ,even though
it is, only a collateral
. .
" or
subsidiary part of the contract of employment, or s?mething added to the principal part of that ~ontract as ammo;;
but none the less a real, feature or detaIl of the contract.
(In re Donovan, supra.) Since the transportation was regularly furnished to the employee solely because of her status
as an employee, the inference is reasonable that the transportation depended upon t~efact o~ the employment and was
incidental to it. (See Dom~nguez v. Pendola, s1£pra.) [6] The
employer's charge for :the transportation, did not ~ra,iisf?rm
tJle agreement into an independent contract of Carr,lage,. smce
the consideration for the employer's agreement was not SImply
the payment of the $4 monthly, but. the perform~n~e of work
,for the company as well. (Amer~can Ooal ,M~mng 00. v.
Orenshaw supra.) The fact that the charge was deduc!ed
from the;mployee's wages definitely indicated the connectIOn
of the transportation with her contract of employment. .
[6] Petitioner contends that the applicant was not actmg
within the course of her employment at the tim~ of her .injury because she was not performing any ser;~ce gr~W1~g
out, of or incidental to her employment. It IS not mdISpens able to recovery, however, that .the emplo~ee. be rendering service to his employer at the tIme of the InJury. (Dominguez v. Pendola, supra; Western Pipe etc. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 49 Cal.App.2d 108, 110-111 [121 P.2d 35];

~ ,
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Smith v~ Industrial Ace. Com., supra.) The essential pre'requisite to compensation is that the danger from which the
injury results be one to which he is exposed as an employee
in his part,icular employment. This requirement is met when,
as an employee and solely by reason of his relationship as
such to his employer, he enters a vehicle regularly provided
by his employer for the purpose of transporting him to or
from the place of employment. (Dominguez v. Pendola,
supra.)
The award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter,
J., and Spence, J. pro tem., concurred.

[Crim. No. 4431. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1942.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN SANCHEZ etal.,
Defendants; ANGELO JOHN PORRELLO, Appellant.
[11 Evidence-Judicial Notice-Courts-Juvenile Courts.-A reviewing court Dlay take judicial, notice of a superior court's
designation of a department thereof to sit as a juvenile coUrt.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1875, subd. 3.)
[2] Criminal Law-Appeal-Presumptions-Transfer of Cause.In, the absence of a showing in the record to the contrary,
wherealninor defendant was sentenced on his plea of guilty
following a transfer of the cause to the department designat¥
asajuvenile court, it wilIbe presumed that the juvenile court
remanded the cause to the criminal department and that it
had power to accept defendant's plea of guilty.
[8] Id.-ltevlew-On Appeals from Orders""":Refusal to Vacate.On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment, the reviewing court may not review alleged error in the
trial court's recessing as a' criminal court and reconvening as
a juvenile ,court instead of transferring the case to the juvenile court department, or in declaring the defendant a ward
of the juvenile court after he had been presumably remanded

[I] ,See 10 Cal.J~. 727; 20 Am:Jur. 101.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 67; [2] Criminal Law,
§1276; [3] Criminal Law, §1263a; [4] Courts, §159; [5] Delinquent Childi-en, §19.

,
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to the superior court for prosecution. Such errors may be
reviewed only on a direct appeal from the order.
[4] Courts-Superior Court-Departments.-Where defendant is
declared a ward of a juvenile court, no other department of
the superior court acting in a general capacity has jurisdictional authority to act in the matter, the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court being exclusive.
[5] Delinquent Children-Suspension of Criminal ProceedingsRemand.-Where a defendant has been declared a ward of
the juvenile court, the superior court cannot perfonn in a
single capacity functions as a juvenile court and as a superior
court acting under the general law, and by a single formal order
vacate the commitment to a house of correction and sentence
the defendant to the state penitentiary. Such order is void and
should be set aside on motion.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County refusing to set aside a judgment. Benjamin
J. Scheinman, Judge. Reversed.
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Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Alberta Belford,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-On March 4, 1941, an information was
filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County against
defendant Angelo John Porrello and two others accusing
'them in counts one and two of the crime of robbery, and of
,-attempted robbery in count three. Defendant, a seventeenyear-old boy, was arraigned in Department 41 of the Superior
Court of LOll Angeles County and pleaded not guilty to all
'caurits of the information. Trial of the action was set for
April 16, 1941, and the case transferred to Department '44.
On the day of the trial the judge of Department 44 transferred the case to Department 39, the department of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County designated to hold
,sessions as a juvenile court. The transcript gives no indication of' the proceedings in Department 39, but shows that on
the following day defendant again appeared in Department
44, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" to count one, pleaded
[4] 8ee 7 Cal.Jur. 681; 14 'Cal.Jur. 136; 31 Am.Jur. 798.
[5] t?ee 14 Cal.Jur. 138; 6 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Sup». 461.
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